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The book is well written and the author conveys basics about rulemaking, table of codes, etc. But analogous to another reviewer left with questions, I found myself with "on the other hands", or "what about xxxx?" at almost every statement. What about the extraordinary span for this particular offering?: a hardcover for $749, versus a used softcover for $.01!I think what I search uncomfortable is the air of inevitability and permanence given to the current circumstances of American lawmaking. For example, the authors contrast the radically more limited rules in 1946 with the vast increase in usage and the more variable and proscriptive use of rules today as though this were an understandable and natural progression. In point of fact, although the earlier 1970s environmental laws were enacted by huge bipartisan majorities and enjoyed rapid initial success in reducing pollution, by the later 1970s they had become and would remain the focus of continued antagonism up to the present. They led to the first Reagan administration's disastrous effort to roll back regulations. The conflict over environmental policy merged into partisan polarization in the 1980s and has intensified since. Anybody today really think the system is working well? If so, why has been impossible to amend or modernize all but the Safe Drinking Water Act since 1990? What about energy policy and global climate change? The primary system, designed for conditions and conceptions of 35-40 years ago has proved to resist reform. Who thinks an industrial company or troops could function under operating policies 35-40 old? Virtually alone among advanced nations the intains a labyrinthine, top-down, command and control system, backed up by punitive measures and litigation. The UN has come to recognize that in in every sphere of societal activity, negative and punitive management systems are inefficient. Just consider our criminal justice system. All 27 EU nations now subscribe to integrated economic and environmental policies involving cooperation rather than coercion. Look on the German EPA web website and see if you can search any word about compliance, violator, violation, and adjudicatory hearings. It's not that German environmental policies are lax. Germany led in proposing the fresh European chemical law, and electrical appliance recycling requirement. It and the more advanced European nations have achieve subtler methods that promote effective environmental policies in parallel with robust industrial performance essential to maintain the kinds of economies that can afford the investments and costs needed to reduce fossil fuel e arguable Globe leader in environmental performance and policy, Sweden, already consolidated and simplified its multiple previous environmental laws in 1999. It now has no regulations at all except for a few European Union laws that are left to member nations to stead it has an Environmental Code of something like 172 pages does not specify performance - it allocates different kinds of activities to relevant political jurisdictions (e.g. ccommunities, states, and regional environmental courts) for environmental management. The political troops benefit from guidance provided by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency - which, however, has no enforcement power!Change will have to come but I'm quite aware that we can't instantaneously move from where we are now to a more enlightened and effective system.
I am on an endless quest, it seems; to search a book on the administrative state that is informative while being at least mildly enthusiastic about its subject. This book starts out enthusiastic. This book certainly started with enthusiasm. The first chapter, in fact, is devoted to convincing us why the administrative state is a superb American invention (a view I do not always share!) Chapter 5, which is devoted to public participation in the Admin. state also bubbles with giddiness. Like a horse on crack-cocaine, though, this book stars with gallant speed, slows down quick and ends with an mild gasp. I'm sure this was not the authors intention. There are two main reasons. First, as the book is structured so that each chapter examines another zone of admin. state rule making (oversight from the 3 branches, rulemaking structure, inherent paradoxes of the process) the first two chapters, which are almost overviews of the rest of the book, builds up high expectations. For example, when the first chapter lightly nibbles at rulemaking's structural issues, tow paragraphs in we are told that we will need to wait untill another chapter for a discussion. The author does this repeatedly throughout the book, thus leaving the reader in a constant hang. The second reason for the flickering finish of the book is that, and unfortunately as with most admin. state books, not much save for completely varied anecdotal info is offered. How are rules written, the book asks; it depends on the administration, it answers. What about modes of public participation and debate? Depends on the rules of the comission. After a while, its almost pointless to read the next chapter as we start to guess the respond to each question posed. The reason, though, for the three stars is this: Chapter 1 (on justifications for the admin. state), Chapter 3(paradoxes inherent in the rulemaking process) and Chapter 7 (the role of theory in rulemaking and its reform) are actually decent and informative chapters. Vagueness aside, they do provide useful anecdotes. Also Chapters 3 and 7 show ideas, discussions and points that are all but ignored in other books on admin. state rulemaking. Buy the book, read those 3 chapters and maybe skim the rest.
Medicaid is a large and complex public program. Thompson's book does a terrific job of explaining how the program has evolved in latest decades. He info the politics behind major changes in an engaging fashion. For anyone interested in understanding how public health programs in the United States got to be how they are, and possibilities for change, this is an necessary text.
Absolutely delighted to hear Frank J. Thompson's webinar presentation at the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) this month. For the field of disability, the book on Medicaid Politics is a amazing find, even bringing in disability protests and the movement. The heart of community care reform at health care financing - the Home and Community-Based Medicaid Waivers (HCBS) - form a core of several chapters from original community development to the next fresh book, Public administration and disability: Community services administration in the US (Racino, in press, 2014) is designed to assure the durability of community services initiatives on behalf of people with disabilities in the US. As I discussed, the transition from state waivers (still often waiving statewideness, and targeted at categorical groups) were designed to be preliminary to standard community services financing in all states in the table in Professor Thompson's book is the epic signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on March 23, 2010 by President Barack Obama to expand health insurance coverage in the US. Though his intent was to cover everyone, approximately 32 million newly insured were expected to enroll; his efforts to assure coverage of persons with pre-existing conditions is met with "cherry picking" by the responsible parties for our health care (yes, must be universal coverage in US).Thompson's book examines the Medicaid program which is consuming a amazing of state budgets (e.g., Florida at 30% of its overall spending, while ranking low on covering not good people, the target population). The Public Administration and Public Policy Professor also notes that "to a significant degree nursing homes and providers of HCBS (that's our NYSACRA, UCPA and Arcs, too, not particularly noted for well care of elders) provide the basic voice for the elderly on state decisions similar to Medicaid" (p.214).Congratulations on the inclusion of Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for insuring kids are covered in the US (supported by our counties and non-profits) as a primary to achieve in a health conscious, allow alone a globe ranking democratic society. The figures of on, off of coverage in states, and the indepth examination of higher and higher specialty costs for kids who then remain poorly served on campuses or private, exposed schools, is a ompson's book, however, is of the fresh politics of globe change, though now to the politics of austerity at the budget gates with advocacy greater for the middle than the low income class, and also for hospital health (often acute care) than community health through non-profit organizations (e.g., private assistance, home health, consumer-directed services, family support). Still ranking high as think tanks are the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (modern long-term care), Familiies USA, Children's Defense Fund (comes in as supporting disability issues), and the book's supporters (Robert Wood Johnson, Rockefeller Institute).Highly recommended. Julie Ann Racino
I latest read Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian Battle while working on my masters over a decade ago. Going though it in less than a week only gave a surface appreciation of one of the West’s most necessary histories. In the years since, I have always wanted to go reread it but never quite found the time – there have always been newer books to read. A shame – and a small embarrassing.I recently picked up How to Think About War: An Ancient Tutorial to Foreign Policy – an imprint from Princeton. It doesn’t show all of the Thucydides’ landmark history but rather a selection of the most popular speeches organized by subject along with an overview of the geopolitical landscape they took put in. The book includes seven speeches around such subjects as Justifying a War; Realpolik and Launching a Foreign Invasion. Each speech has a fresh translation. Reading through them gave me fond memories of studying for my masters and a greater appreciation of the timeless problems that still affect international relations today. The selection of speeches is impressive in a fairly little book and the fresh translations seem to have created them even more accessible. This book isn’t a replacement for the Landmark Thucydides – which is still the gold standard but rather an perfect inceton has published other extra books under its Ancient Wisdom for Modern Readers including How to Be A Friend: An Ancient Tutorial to Real Friendship by Cicero. I plan on picking up some of the other books in the series.I was skeptical but optimistic when I began How To Think About War. Too a lot of latest international relations books are covering the current political climate and come off as screeds. How to Think About Battle avoids that trap and something that will be on my work bookshelf for decades. Highly Recommended.
"Anyone who maintains that we have nothing useful to learn from listening to speeches either lacks sense or has a secret agenda at stake." This is one of a lot of pearls from Johanna Hanink's unbelievable translation of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, and it reads just as relevant today as when it was written twenty-five centuries ago.'How to Think About War' is a collection of six speeches from Thucydides' History that cover a wide range of Ancient Greek foreign policy, among them the decision to go to war, alliances, peace talks, whether or not to present mercy, changes in public opinion, the economic and emotional costs of war, and a lot of others. The book comes with an perfect introduction that prepares readers for the text and its influence on contemporary US foreign policy—particularly Thucydides' popularity within the neoconservative moment—and each chapter opens with a brief but thorough summary that frames each passage within its historical context. I found these primers particularly interesting when reading rousing speeches for battles that ultimately ended unfavorably for the Athenians, which I imagine should give any American reader an uncomfortably sense of e effect is an perfect book easily accessible to any reader, be they students of history, politics, philosophy, Ancient Greek (the book is bilingual), or current events. Thucydides' History also provides a provocative glimpse into human behavior just as necessary to know outside of the classroom, as evidenced in the headlines dominating out news every day. This text is ultimately a case study on the power of speeches on a warlike population, and if the George W. Bush administration didn't demonstrate this enough for our century, I am hopeful the show administration will create it clear for all history.I most highly recommend this book and this particular edition. (I am already looking forward to reading more titles from Princeton's "Ancient Wisdom" series.) Five stars.
Amazon: The main attraction of this book is to provide a fresh and fluent translation of key speeches in Thucydides. The text sample now available consists of a lengthy introduction and not a single passage of translation. Without some of the speeches it is impossible to judge the book. Please modify the sample to cover a very few pages of introduction and short extracts from at least two speeches. Thank you.
For anyone who might have studied Greek in the past and wants to recover or increase his/her knowledge, this one of a series of Greek and Latin essays with the text and facing translation, published by Princeton, will search the method created much easier and pleasant. Not so long ago at least 2 years of high school Latin was needed by the best colleges for entrance; 2 years of high school Greek was desirable. I congratulate Princeton!
This is a short, fast introduction to a major early Western thinker. The commentary at the begin of the book gives a modern context to the long-term influence of Thucydides up the present. There are fascinating remarks about how the Neocons used the approaches of Thucydides. The speech selections give a flavor of the entire History of the Peloponnesian War. The footnotes and bibliography are an enticement to further reading and study. The value of this book is an introduction, not as a comprehensive treatment.
The sub-title 'A tourist guide' describes exactly what this is. It's very practical, with info on what clothes to take, how to rent a car, tipping, visas, locations of interest and locations to stay. I've not (yet) been to Eritrea, but there is plenty of useful info here plus a small general background on history and culture.
Nothing to this at all. A few paragraphs, looks like printed on someone’s home printer. The paragraphs are generic descriptions of about 7 key websites in the country - so maybe about 100 lines of text in the whole book. Not at all a travel guide. Rather, someone printed off a few paragraphs from Wikipedia or somewhere, printed them in their basement, and are pretending that makes a travel guide. I’d give zero stars if I could.
THIS BOOK WAS VERY HELPFUL TO ME ON MY VISIT TO ERITREA, I HAD NEVER BEEN THERE BEFORE AND IT PROVIDED ME WITH A VALUABLE REFERENCE GUIDE. MY FAMILY CONNECTED ME TO MY ROOTS BUT THE BOOK HELPED ME EXPLORE ALL THE DIFFERENT POINTS OF INTEREST IN ASMARA AND THE REST OF ERITREA. IF YOUR LOOKING FOR A GROUP TO TOUR ERITREA WITH, GO TO N.U.E.Y.S HEADQUARTERS IN ASMARA. THEY GIVE TOURS IN THE SUMMER. ONE LOVE.
This book is a unbelievable overview of the history of relationships between and among countries of the globe - I found it fascinating, and uniquely informative. I've never had such a clear understanding of the machinations of international relationships. It's complex, and content-rich. Not a quick or simple read because there's so much to learn. It takes patience and time to read it, but my patience was rewarded by a rich learning experience. I first became aware of Richard [email protected]#$% through a TV interview, perhaps with Charlie Rose. I was very impressed with his knowledge, which lead me to read his book. After a brief rest, I intend to look into his other books. There's so much to be learned from ldfellow
Allison Stanger's fresh book, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power And The Future of Foreign Policy, is must reading for anyone concerned with the architecture of foreign policy. It is particularly valuable for those of us whose public service predates the outsourcing explosion of latest years. Prof. Stanger paints her picture of the wholly transformed landscape that statesmen inhabit in the 21st century with stunning hard data meticulously collected and analyzed. It is this grounding of her argument in numbers that pierced the shell of experiential knowledge that blinded me to the transformation of institutions I once worked in and now study.Her argument is that the U.S. government has embraced outsourcing its overseas agenda as a solution for every international problem, with disastrous unintended consequences. That combined with a simultaneous explosion of creative initiatives bubbling up from below, both in the for-profit and not-for profit sectors, have true foreign policy impact. For her, the transformation of the politics and process of foreign policy elevates the "how" above the "what" and means that implementation defines the substance and has led to a militarization of American foreign policy. Finally, she situates these power shifts of the disaggregated state within the context of a personal sector populated by corporations with unprecedented global a gardener, I understand the importance of surging plant material in the landscape. When I began gardening in earnest on Cape Cod in 2004, I planted native shrubs, like Red Osier Dogwood, to quickly fill the gaps until the specimen trees I had planted to replace our beloved but dying Pitch Pines could mature. For years the Red Osier performed beautifully. Then, I noticed that they were overwhelming the garden scheme by suckering and fountaining. Suckers, as any amazing gardener knows, are often undesirable because "the plant's energy is diverted to the sucker rather than to crown growth." The solution is to prune those suckers and, every few years, reshape the plant to constrain its growth and conform its shape to the desired lison Stanger has the same tip for the U.S. government: obtain out those loppers. Collaboration with personal sector entities in pursuit of national security is essential in this networked globe and certain naturalizing of government functions in the personal sector is healthy. The foreign affairs landscape is changing organically and cannot be returned to some old-fashioned topiary filled parterre. But, if the national interest and the public amazing are to be served rather than personal profit, principals in the foreign affairs agencies need to obtain out their shears and prune those suckers!
As a former student of American Diplomatic History, I found Mead's book quite interesting, especially his effective classification of the four groups. Even though these are artificial constructs, they do create it easier to understand the thinking of those who, periodically bring pressure to bear on foreign policy decision-makers. The book is a small out-dated but provides some amazing points of reference. I am still trying to determine how Hamiltonian, Wilsonian and Jeffersonian I am. I am a mixture of all but am not, for sure, a Jacksonian.
I noticed that the audible item was offered at a nominal cost "with" the kindle purchase, but only with the of a membership/unnecessary application if not purchased with the other format for the book. It would be much more interesting and fun to the audibles if the stuff formatted for that were available for WITHOUT the forced of the separate app,. The apps are not important to listen to audible files. Windows has all it needs to do that. Personally, I would a LOT of audibles and kindle formatted stuff if there weren't such unnecessary strings attached that use up our zone and just add unnecessary costs all the method around. We customers do message when a company is trying to gouge us for all they can get... such as with the prime crap for shipping alone.
Mead breaks down hundreds of years of American political evolution into four nicely defined schools of thought and goes on to explain each in amazing detail. Definitively a must read for those interested in American foreign policy and political history.
The four "schools" Mead presents have compelling narratives that resonate in all of us yet are somewhat in conflict with each other: are we traders? do we agitate for a better world? should we hold ourselves to ourselves? if we war do we utterly destroy our enemies?Mead has helped me understand the "other side", and be much more sympathetic to these points of view. Whenever I ponder US foreign policy questions, I now start by asking myself how Mead's schools align on the question. Further, I search Mead's schools are quite relevant and interesting when applied to domestic issues.
Had to this for a grad school course and initially dreaded having to read yet another lengthy book; however, I was pleasantly surprised by how simple the book is to read, as well as how informative and interesting it is.
If I had to choose the most necessary of the thousands of books I have read over the past seventy years it would be this one. Professor Walt critiques the policy of Liberal Hegemony which the United States has followed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is sorry tale of hubris and failed wars. The foreign policy establishments of the Republican and Democrat parties are Tweedledum and Tweedlee. Both have failed us.Walt suggests replacing our current belligerence with a policy which he describes as off shore balancing.
Richard [email protected]#$%, a person I like (From TV) and respect has written a very long Foreign Affairs article on a foreign policy for the United States. It would be very appropriate for Hillary Clinton, not so much for Donald Trump. After all Haass is a pillar of the establishment, being president of the Council on Foreign Relations for the past fourteen years.He is a student of Henry Kissinger and, as such, he goes back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which represents the beginnings of the nation state system as we know it. He believes that system which is based on the non-interference of the internal affairs of a state is inadequate for the 21st Century. He believes that states have the “sovereign obligation”, to reign in terrorism, war drug trafficking, prevent nuclear proliferation, and with climate change. This is a far cry from the Westphalian System and it necessarily breeds suspicion of the established powers trying to enforce their codes on smaller states.He is rightly critical of the Obama policies in Syria, Libya and Iraq. And in the 1990s he was prescient in proposing a preventive strike versus North Korea’s then nascent nuclear program. The Clinton Administration failed to hear is warning and we are now suffering its consequences.Haass opens his book with the Brexit vote. However, there is no true follow through. This is a true failure of his book because in my opinion the foreign policy challenges are not external, but rather internal. There is a revolt going on versus the global elite of which Haass is an exemplar and I am a mere plebian. It is that revolt that is reordering foreign policy: witness France, Turkey, Hungary and above all the election of Donald Trump. Thus as Dr. Kissinger has taught us, in to be successful a foreign policy has to have domestic support. I fear Haass’ ideas have yet to convince the general public. It is here where work has to be done.
[email protected]#$% is making amazing points, if you can obtain through the suprisingly not good punctuation; he obviously ignored his grammer correction pop-ups. Then there's the long-winded paragraphs that end up making no sense even after you read them over again; (it's another case of one trying to fill a book with words). I couldn't [email protected]#$%!, so it would be tough to give it a fair review. READ Globe Order, By Henry Kissinger for a more elegantly written book on the topic.Haass is better seen in person.
Some of the talking points and statistics in this book are quite interesting to learn about. I feel however that the book is too textbook - Statistics and graphs and redundant points obtain tiresome. Of course, this is partly my fault since I was not aware of the authour's writing style prior to buying the book.Ultimately the book fills us in on the laissez-faire going-ons of the U.S. government. Some of it is I'm sure well-known fact and some it may well surprise some of you who do not necessarily follow politics closely. I personally feel the problems posed in this book are bound to be replicated in future administrations just as government really has not changed in the latest 70 to 100 years, so ultimately I believe the readers of this book will become jaded a week after en again...perhaps I am a pessimist?NOTE: I just noticed that I reviewed the paperback edition by accident - I purchased the Kindle Edition - It doesn't change my review of the book of course; however, I would point out that the Kindle Edition suffers from some not good formatting.
This book helped clear away a lifetime of grey ambiguous info that never seemed to follow logical paths. It gives clear well thought out and documented explanations for what had appeared to be logical dead proves that our foreign policy needs to be brought under control and organized in an effective fashion.
Very well organized and thoughtful presentation current and previous couple of decade performance of US liberal hegemony foreign policy elites. Author convincingly presents the systematic issues of current establishments and the down os provides a very thoughtful and compelling alternative of offshore balancing to follow .
Really created me rethink my perspective on US foreign policy. I had fallen for the myth that (in brief) the US was either isolationist or trying to take on the world. The reality is that in periods of apparent isolationism, the US actually had a remarkably successful foreign policy, based in a lot of ways on ad comes up with four schools of US foreign policy thought, named after key characters in US history: Hamiltonian (realist/mercantile), Wilsonian (idealist), Jeffersonian (libertarian), and Jacksonian (populist). These four trends work with and versus each other to make policies that have helped lift the US to the top of the international tree, despite looking like the US can't really cope with foreign policy making.Well written and engaging, it's one of the few books I've had to read for a class that I think I'd've read anyway.
This book has a lot of problems:1. Poorly written -- the author saps the life out of what could be a very interesting subject with boring prose and endless repetition of stock phrases that the book fails to imbue with any concrete meaning. (e.g., "We need intelligent privatization that leverages public-private cooperation.")2. It doesn't even bother to explain the info of how contracting actually works. It would have been helpful to provide a few examples of defense contracts and present how they are procured, negotiated, and executed (including the sub-contracting). It might also have been interesting to hear from some military veterans who switched over to the personal sector, or some of the larger defense contractors (to at least give them a possibility to argue that they provide a net benefit to the nation).3. The author does not seriously attempt to assess whether contracting is in fact economically efficient, although this would have been difficult because so much of the info about individual contracts (both the cost and the services provided) are not public.4. Much of the book is not even about contracting at all (e.g., the USAID and DHS chapters spend more time on those agencies respective histories than on how they use contractors).5. The author's much repeated suggestion that contractors should not be tasked with oversight of contractors is beautiful self-evident (although it is indeed troubling that the government pays millions of dollars to contractors so they can evaluate other contractors).
It would be difficult to identify anyone other than Henry Kissinger who represents the tradition of America’s bipartisan foreign policy more fully than Richard A. [email protected]#$%. Haass is the longtime president of the Council on Foreign Relations, which comes as close as any institution to sitting at the center of gravity for the internationalist wing of the Eastern establishment. For decades before he began at the Council, he cycled in and out of senior policy planning and diplomatic posts in government and a series of positions in academia and other establishment thinktanks. If you wish to obtain a handle on the conventional wisdom that emanates from that elite group of scholars and officials, read Haass’ recent book, A Globe in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old e three phases of international relationsHaass’s abbreviated survey of international relations in the modern globe divides history into three phases. The first began with the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid-17th century that ended Europe’s Thirty Years Battle and established the primacy of the sovereign state. That phase lasted through the end of Globe Battle II, which upended globe affairs in profound ways. The second phase lasted from 1945 until the end of the Cold Battle in 1989. This was a period of superpower supremacy, the absence of large-scale conflict, and unsurpassed economic growth. We now live in the third phase, a troubled “world in which centrifugal forces are gaining the upper hand.”Haass argues that “the past twenty-five years since the end of the Cold Battle constitute a break with the past . . . [S]omething very various is afoot in the world.” He characterizes the current state of affairs as “disarray.” In his view, the word “captures both where we are and where we are heading.” This is not the multipolar globe so a lot of observers write about. It’s a nonpolar world. “Power is more distributed in more hands than at any time in history,” Haass notes. “The same holds for technology.” In Haass’ view, the multiple uncertainties and dangers of today’s globe require that the United States be more assertive on the globe stage. He “argues for the stationing of military forces in and around locations that either China or Russia might claim or move against, something that translates into maintaining increased U.S. ground and air forces in Europe and increased air and naval forces in the Asia-Pacific.” Other observers might see greater reliance of this sort on the U.S. military as a prescription for bankruptcy at home and risky conflict abroad.A fresh approach to foreign policyThe essence of Haass’ thesis is that the concept of state sovereignty established by the Treaty of Westphalia is no longer adequate in a nonpolar world. Today’s international landscape is no longer dominated either by the major powers or exclusively by nation states. Nonstate actors, including international and regional organizations, corporations, terrorist groups, some major cities, and numerous other entities all play roles in setting the direction of civilization today. Haass contends that “the post-World Battle II order—effectively Globe Order 1.0—provided only a degree of structure for the international system once the overlay and discipline of the Cold Battle disappeared. Just as important, the globe was not well positioned to with the diffusion of power that was to come.”In this much more complex environment, U.S. foreign policy must be directed toward establishing a fresh concept in globe affairs: “sovereign obligation.” Haass views this as the ideal operating principle in contemporary international affairs. Under sovereign obligation, every state would be expected not merely to tend to its domestic affairs but also to play a role in addressing the multiple global challenges that bedevil us today: nuclear proliferation, climate change, terrorism, restrictions on trade, threats to global health, the vulnerable state of international finance, and the abuse of cyberspace. (The author’s laundry list does not contain drug trafficking.)It’s difficult not to see this prescription as wishful thinking. Another failing in Haass’ analysis is his failure to distinguish between global threats that are existential and those that aren’t. Any dispassionate observer of climate change, nuclear proliferation, and the growing potential for pandemics would surely agree that any of these three challenges could be fateful for civilization if not for the human race. The other challenges in Haass’ list, while serious, do not rise to the same level. Global trade could constrict, terrorism increase, the international financial system seize up, and cybercrime and cyberwarfare proliferate, but it’s highly unlikely that any of these happenings would end human civilization, much less lead the human race to extinction.“What is to be done?”Haass makes clear his belief that yesterday’s foreign policy is not adequate for “a globe in which not all foes are always foes and not all mates are always friendly.” He advances a detailed set of recommendations, not just for U.S. foreign policy but for changes in domestic policy as well. His tip about foreign affairs is, as anyone might expect, highly nuanced. On domestic affairs, his approach is less so. It’s hard to distinguish from traditional moderate Republican policies. For example, he advocates both decisive action to reduce the nation’s debt and increasing the Pentagon’s budget. To enable all this, he favors raising the retirement age, reducing Medicare and Medicaid, and eliminating tax deductions for home mortgage payments and charitable deductions. Wishful thinking again, given any reasonable expectation for Congressional action.A nonpartisan analysis?At the outset of A Globe in Disarray, Haass claims that his analysis will favor neither Republicans nor Democrats. It doesn’t come across that way. It’s real that he is pointed in his criticism of the decision to invade Iraq and of the conduct of the battle that followed. But his discussion of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy is savage. Haass reserves his most hard-edged criticism for Obama’s decision to accelerate the drawdown of units from Iraq, the conduct of the battle in Afghanistan, the outspoken help for the Arab Spring, the intervention in Libya, and the decision not to attack Syria after Hafez el-Asaad crossed the “red line” by using chemical warfare on his citizens. This is not a nonpartisan analysis.About the authorPresident of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2003, Richard A. Haas has also served as a senior advisor to President George H. W. Bush and to his son, President George W. Bush, as well as in a number of other diplomatic and scholarly posts. A Globe in Disarray is his 12th book.
A amazing first half, the Treaty of Westphalia is well discussed as a basis for a ver of Mutual Destruction of that period. My issue is the discusion of the Non Proliferation Treaty reads like a Colonial excuse for the Belgians who invaded the Congo and robbed resources for over a century - "we huge boys can have nuclear weapons and as a lot of as we want, and the rest of you can have none as we know better than you" - Gadaffi give up his nuke program and the US aided the guys who killed him and North Korea has them and gets due respect - it's realistic that crazy regimes should not have WMD capability, but the author assumes the right of the 5 huge boys as god given and beyond question. It leaves the otherwise amazing book as an excuse for huge boys to dictate the future.
This is a well written, well researched, and well reasoned criticism of Liberal Hegemony (“LH”). LH rests on the belief that the United States is uniquely positioned to spread democracy and shape the international system to promote international peace and prosperity. LH has led to the invasion of Iraq, military efforts in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism operations in Somalia, Yemen, Libya and Syria. The results, according to Walt, are not favorable:• Our military operations have been costly in both dollars and lives but have had scant success;• The number of violent extremists and the number of locations where they are active is greater now then when Al Qaeda first emerged;• Our military efforts have made resentment because of civilian casualties;• Our foreign activities have taken time, attention and resources away from pressing domestic concerns; and• Efforts to promote democracy and human rights have gone into reverse with a decline in a lot of countries of political rights and civil liberties. In spite of this, LH continues to be advocated almost universally in the media and by political and foreign policy commentators. People who criticize its exercise are ostracized. Nevertheless, Walt names proponent’s names and few well known political and military spokesmen are spared. Walt reviews Trump’s foreign policy and military efforts and concludes he has created matters worse. Walt presents a very persuasive alternative tactic that he calls Offshore Balancing. It would entail a continued powerful military but much less active military involvement in other countries and more use of diplomacy. This is truly a book well worth reading.
In a "World In Disarray" Dr. [email protected]#$% gives a comprehensive and thoughtful overview of the old international globe and how we got where we are today. Additionally he an objective analysis, covering all the hot spot locations from Russia, the Middle East, China and nuclear nonproliferation. Haass also prescribes substantive solutions for steps both governments and civil societies can take at coming up with better and more feasible foreign policy decisions for a more complex as he refers to it "world 2.0." A badly required breath of new air for a fresh American foreign policy and a must read for global citizen.Andy Laub- Young Specialists in Foreign Policy, Director.
Richard [email protected]#$% may not have reached the heights of power of a Henry Kissinger (World Order) but his work over several administrations at the State Department and other institutions, presently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, give him as much exposure to the process of policy making and the demands of the international environment if not the gravitas to have his ideas seriously considered as the Secretary of State. Dr. Haass here writes from much experience. His view of the globe situation is well nuanced, enough so that he knows there are issues in a lot of locations and on a lot of levels. Some have no realistic hope of resolution any time broad outline this book is like that of Dr. Kissinger's. Dr. Haass begins with a broad review of how we got where we are beginning as so a lot of of these books do with the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid 17th Century. But Haass quickly breaks things down into little chunks encompassing not only the world's regions and nations in those regions but multiple factors cutting across those divisions. Culture, history, geography, technology, economics, identity politics, human migrations, income disparity, demographics, education, trade, and more are all examined singularly and with regard to their interacting impacts. Haass appears to understand both the central importance of the United States (the world's biggest single economic and military power), and the limits of even an "engaged America" on the trajectory of globe affairs.Dr. Kissinger created broad recommendations and so does Dr. Haass. In fact the two men are very much in line with one another broadly speaking. But Dr. Haass also makes numerous specific recommendations some going some method towards resolving issues, others merely managing the presently unresolveable. His recommendations are all thoughtfully helpful. Some are broad, some very narrow, all difficult to achieve in the show world. Haass' politics appears to be a small more conservative than mine. On the topic of income disparity for example he says that [absurd] concentrations of wealth are not in themselves bad, the issue rather is that there are too a lot of people with too little. It's hard to argue with the latest part, but for some reason he does not connect up the impossibility of spreading the wealth as long as so few individuals and corporations hoard (and he admits hide) most of it.On the whole he and I agree, cooperation is, barring gross violations of human dignity, better than tournament and conflict. His recommendations are mostly common sense. If any half of his recommendations were to be implemented I'm sure the globe would be a better place. The possibility that even some half of them will come to any fruition however is almost zero. Even before the election of Donald Trump. This book was published in January 2017 just prior to Trump's inauguration. Even then, the global situation was deteriorating (had been for some years) with tournament more and more coming to replace cooperation. My Kindle edition (not sure of the other formats) has, in addition an afterword written some ten months into Trump's presidency. As Haass ticks off Trump's policy implementations the reader cannot support but note that not only are things getting worse but now at an accelerated rate, and not only globally, but also inside the United States. Trump is undoing even that which, however imperfectly, was helpful prior to his election. With almost 9 billion people on the Earth, "globalism is not a choice, but a fact". We will not survive without major conflict for much longer under the show global effort to dismantle e book is a amazing and comprehensive take on what should be done, what must be done, and what America could do to stave off disaster. Not only are we not going in the right direction, we are very much deliberately going in the wrong one.
This clear, concise, well-written book added a amazing to my understanding of foreign policy Despite covering a lot of ground, the book is not overly long nor pedantic. He makes very clear where we've come from, what our challenges are, and what we could do. The latest chapter focuses on the situation in US and where we can go right and wrong. The possibilities for the US now are both provocative and frightening. Since this book was written before the 2016 election, he doesn't comment on the breakdown in foreign policy we've had since then. In fact, we seem to be doing exactly the things he advises versus and warns us about. I wound up feeling much more knowledgeable and much less sanguine about our future, given the direction of the current administration.
The book give us a clear picture about the enormous issues that the goverment is facing because the abnoxious influence of the unique interest and the corrupt politicians that are at their service...geed is the name of the game.
I first read Walter Russell Mead's Unique Providence soon after it was published in 2001, just months prior to 9/11. This was before I had started writing book reviews in 2003, but I remember being favorably impressed. Since then, I have read, and reviewed, several books Professor Mead cites and wanted to see how my impression might change given this extra background. I'm still impressed, but perhaps in various 2001, I was impressed with Professor Mead's easy but elegant characterization of four schools of thought that influenced the history of American foreign policy. He names each school after a popular proponent of its policies,1. Hamiltonian: Named for Alexander Hamilton, the goals of this school are to further American commercial interests with the world.2. Wilsonian: Named for Woodrow Wilson, the goals of this school are the creation of international organizations and legal structures based on law and morality. This school is a powerful supporter of such organizations as the League of Nations, United Nations, Globe Court, etc.3. Jeffersonian: Named for Thomas Jefferson, this school sought to minimize foreign entanglements (Washington's words, I believe) not only to avoid potential foreign conflicts but also to avoid domestic policy impacts such as maintaining a huge and expensive standing military force and accompanying military-industrial complex. This school is based on Jefferson's own libertarian approach to government in both domestic and foreign affairs.4. Jacksonian: Named for Andrew Jackson, this school is defined less by its policies than by its membership, typically lower and middle class Americans, originally of predominantly Scots-Irish descent, but now expanded to contain those from other ethnic groups who are willing to accept their principles of patriotism and code of honor. These are the people who typically from the backbone of our armed forces and, consequently, Jacksonians typically put amazing emphasis on maintaining a powerful military. At the same time, as the group that provides the bulk of our soldiers, they oppose battles they perceive as unnecessary, unwinnable, or not vital to the American interest (which they define as their own interest). Once engaged, however, they will insist that the battle be fought to a clear win with all important resources. Limited wars, limited objectives, and limited resources are anathema. Jacksonians use various rules and standards for dealing with fellow Americans, especially fellow Jacksonians, than with the outside ntrasting the four schools, Wilsonians and Hamiltonians strive for globe based on morality and commerce, respectively. Jacksonian and Jeffersonians are suspicious or hostile to these global goals, Jeffersonians in a libertarian sense, Jacksonians in a nationalistic ad is careful to point out that this naming convention is convenient shorthand; the schools existed both before and after their namesakes. He also points out that the four schools have overlapped, formed shifting alliances among themselves, and changed their focus over time. For example, the Hamiltonian School shifted from favoring protectionist tariffs to supporting trade sometime in the mid 20th ad also spends a fair amount of time contrasting American foreign policy with Continental realism, aka the Westphalian System, under which European states agreed to directly on a government-to-government basis and avoid interfering in each other's internal affairs. In this section, he points out that:1. Economic problems play a more significant role in American and British foreign policy than in Continental Realism which focuses almost entirely on political and military relationships.2. Domestic politics differ from international politics. In domestic politics, at least in democracies, a social contract is assumed. The state is assumed to have the best interests of the citizens in mind. In international politics, there is no social contract. National self interest is paramount under the Westphalian system, amorality trumps both morality and immorality.3. Continental Realism's influence in the US peaked in the Nixon-Kissinger era. The economic and moral elements were not regained until the Carter and Reagan years. Nixon's termination of the Breton Woods international monetary regime was the ultimate withdrawal of the US from the economic aspects of foreign policy. More than anything, the US withdrawal from Breton Woods unified the European governments in their pursuit of an independent monetary authority. The Nixon years also saw the termination of the moral element of foreign policy. Any anti-communist government deserved our support. This amoral approach was reversed by Carter's emphasis on human rights and given a major boost by Reagan's denunciation of the Evil Empire and call to Gorbachev to "tear down this wall". Together, the reentry of the economic and moral aspects of foreign policy led to the collapse of the Soviet ad also describes the history of US foreign policy as one determined primarily by our evolving relationship with Amazing Britain. He describes four phases of this relationship and of US policy:1. 1776-1823: The US won its independence from Britain and the two nations then worked and fought to define their economic and commercial relationship.2. 1823-1914: The US existed in a British-dominated globe order, but one within which both nations recognized locations where American concerns required to be considered, i.e., the Monroe Doctrine to which Britain tacitly subscribed to prevent other European powers from establishing control over newly independent nations in the western hemisphere.3. 1914-1947: The two globe battles and the loss of its empire destroyed the British-dominated globe while the US struggled to decide how to fill the resulting void: Prop up Britain, replace Britain, or allow the rest of the globe tend to its own problems.4. 1947-1991: By 1947, it was apparent what Britain would not be able to maintain its dominance of the globe in the face of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The US stepped into the void. The Cold Battle era ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in , what did I obtain out or rereading Unique Providence ten years after its publication?My first reaction was that the four schools really represent various dimensions of power in globe affairs. In his 1998 book, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold Battle History, John Lewis Gaddis cites five dimension of power: military, economic, cultural, moral, and ideological. Using these dimensions, the Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian schools emphasized economic, moral, ideological, and military power, respectively. Would using these impersonal terms instead of naming the schools for popular individuals would have avoided some confusion? For example, Jefferson and his supporters strongly supported the initial phases of the French revolution (prior to the terror). However, help of democratic movements abroad is more a Wilsonian policy than one associated with the Jeffersonian-libertarian school as defined by Mead. On the other hand, Mead's naming convention did create me think through this question, which makes it a plus in my essor Mead alludes to a parallel between his four schools of thought and David Hackett Fischer's four British Folkways of settlers in America which he cites in his book Albion's Seed:1. The Puritans from East Anglia who settled in Fresh England2. The Royalists from the south and west of England, defeated by Cromwell's Puritans in the English Civil War, 1642-51, who settled in Virginia and Maryland3. The Quakers and their religious kin who settled in Pennsylvania, Fresh Jersey, and Delaware4. The Scots-Irish who settled in the Appalachians west of the earlier colonies.I've tried to map these four groups to Mead's four schools. The only clear correspondence is between Fischer's Scots-Irish and Mead's Jacksonians which is obvious since the Jacksonians are defined as Scots-Irish in origin. The Wilsonians and Hamiltonians both seem to incorporate some elements of both the Fresh England Puritans and the Quakers of the middle colonies. The Jeffersonians seem to have no obvious intellectual connection to any of Fischer's four Folkways; although Jefferson was a Virginian, his philosophy was not at all related to the defeated Stuart Royalists who settled that colony. Perhaps I have missed something in this comparison; if anyone wants to leave a comment on my review, I'd welcome also occurs to me that the four schools do not carry equal weight in determining US policy. Currently, I'd subjectively assign weights of perhaps 20%, 20%, 15%, and 45% respectively to the Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools. However, these weights undoubtedly have changed a lot of times from 1776 to today. It would be interesting to see a well argued description of these evolving weights, but I guess that is really a separate research project. Perhaps Professor Mead will consider it for a future book.
This is a very interesting book with a special perspective in understanding American foreign policy and American political culture in general. It has helped to refine the method that I think about American politics.
Another timely and insightful analysis by Dr Nye of the American political landscape. Readers will especially appreciate the grades given to each President from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump by this distinguished Harvard professor. The reader may well ask whether the Trump grade of “mixed” will remain after Trump’s recent vagaries.???
In the first part of the book Dr. [email protected]#$% gives an informed and insightful overview of the geo-political forces that shaped the globe from the rise of the modern state system in the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the Cold War. The second part chronicles the collapse of order, or the emergence of geo-political disarray, following the Cold War. As he puts it, “What exists [today] in a lot of parts of the globe as well as in different venues of international relations resembles more a fresh globe disorder.” In the third and final section of the book he goes on to prescriptions for moving forward, all under a conceptual umbrella of what Dr. Haass calls “sovereign obligation.”It is a worthy read, to be sure. Haas is clearly a player and has a scholar’s ability to read between the lines and draw broad lessons and conclusions. In that respect we need more like him.He is, however, an establishment player. That’s not meant to be a criticism, but the narrative has a familiar feel to it. His interpretations are often new, but the lens generally isn’t. And while he claims in the beginning that he won’t be partisan, he’s not completely successful in that effort. That’s okay, too, however. Non-partisan is an oxymoron when it comes to anyone with ties to Washington.He makes a powerful case that the 2003 Iraq Battle was a misguided but watershed moment in foreign policy that recklessly introduced “preventive” intervention to the foreign policy debate. The doctrine of regime change flowed from there, built, he argues, on the decidedly false assumption that the Middle East was ripe for democracy and Iraq would set the dominoes in motion.While reading the book, one of my over-arching impressions was that Dr. Haass puts amazing emphasis on traditional statesmanship (gender neutral) and statesmen. That’s no surprise given that he is the president of the Council on Foreign Relations and served as an adviser to President George H. W. Bush and Under Secretary of State to Colin Powell. I’m not sure the simplicity of amazing statespeople fits any more, however. It seems to me that the forces driving our current history, as such, are much more complex and nuanced. The statesmanship model gives insufficient weight, I think, to the role of primary economics and human psychology. (And perhaps the impact of technology.)In addition to remaining statesmen-centric, the obligation model also remains largely US-centric. I have particular reservations about his general help of a modified variation of President Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” (It was later reclassified as a rebalancing.) Having lived in China for nine years I continue to believe that American politicians and strategists—Americans in general, in fact—fail to appreciate the very fundamental difference in the Chinese globe view. We simply cannot interpret China’s behavior through a Western e only other limitation of the book is one of timing. Dr. Haass notes that he completed the book before the 2016 US presidential election and while his private choice for president is not revealed, it would be interesting to obtain his take now, given the continued march into global disarray.Which makes me wonder if the prescription he outlines (i.e. sovereign obligation), even if warranted, is remotely achievable in the current political climate. There seems to be an underlying need for social and political consensus for it to work and that just doesn’t seem possible any time the end, it’s a thoughtful read and I eagerly await the sequel, should there be one. A Globe in Disarray may not quite qualify as transformative, but it is a thoughtful and insightful move in that direction.
I generally enjoyed the body of this thoughtful book, with its topic of foreign policy challenges now and in the near future for America. I noticed that [email protected]#$% repeatedly brought in the leftwing claim of "climate change" as a matter for general globe and American concern, but it was possible to skip over those short passages and the rest seemed sensible analyses and prescriptions to me. The afterword, however, is frankly anti-Trump and spoils the book, in my opinion. Haass gives the timeline for his book -- he wrote and rewrote it starting from a 2015 lecture series and sent it off for printing in early September of 2016, well before the election. Which certainly explains the praiseworthy political neutrality of the main text : he thought Hillary Clinton would win, as did the rest of us given the grossly biased and incorrect polls. We have lately seen so a lot of scholarly political books spoiled by the outraged anti-Trump bias of authors who used to have a amazing reputation for objectivity. This afterword basically says that the globe is getting much worse in terms of disarray and Trump is not the man to with it. I much preferred the analysis of long time spans past in the main text: the analysis of two years into the Trump administration is method too short term and not of interest, I'd say. The book would have been stronger without the afterword.
Very insightful and informative book. The topic is detailed and explained well, for every reader to feel theimpact that our country experiences with using businesses within government to operate. The association is a two edgedeffect, and has implications far beyond stated public political policies. A must read for any American!
To be honest, I couldn't finish the book. Initially it was interesting and was thinking that it was going to be more about factual anecdotes about how the government outsources much of its power overseas and how it went wrong but it seems more of a term paper with constant references to other books and articles.
The intent of this book is to highlight the implications of privatizing government policy, that show practice is scandalous, and that undoing government privatization is not the answer. Unfortunately, Stanger's overly academic treatise fails in all three missions, though her anecdotes and documentation of some of the numbers involved create the book worthy of a fast e Dept. of Defense is a amazing put to start. Stanger points out that the Pentagon's acquisition workforce shrank 25% between 1990-2000, while the volume of contracting increased 7X, and that between 2002-2005, the number of its contract employees rose from 3.4 million to 5.2 million. A key point here is that the simplest method to handled increased contracting with reduced staff is to problem giant contracts that let subcontracting as desired - including evaluations. Thus, we end up with contracts that generate sub-contracts that generate sub-contracts, etc., for as a lot of as five layers - adding costs at every layer. Then there's the missing billions in Iraq. Another typical issue is that different reports on procurement estimate that at least half of these contracts take put without full and begin competition. Thus, there is no need for surprise when Stanger points out that a school costing ASAID $25,000 to build in Afghanistan could have instead be built for $50,000 by local Afghans (and probably generated amazing feelings for the U.S. at the same time). As for quality - shoddy electrical work by KBR is blamed for the deaths of at least 18 soldiers in Iraq, and Blackwater Security severely damaged U.S. credibility when it killed 17 civilians in anger is correct that personal contracting weakens control over government policy, but she does not acc for some of the major mechanisms by which this occurs. A major source of the issue is that creative people can always search their method around a government contract; this issue is sometimes further acerbated intentionally by government managers, and the fact that government contract positions are not beautiful to anyone with high skills and initiative. Then there's the 'revolving door problem. A USAToday article (11/16/09) pointed out that 158 retired general officers now consult for the Pentagon, and most also work for personal industry - all at salaries far exceeding their former military pay. Clearly, the potential lure of those jobs can skew thinking of today's active-duty leaders. My own experience with contractors and consultants is that they spend about half their time looking for ways to extend and expand their scope of work, are much harder to obtain rid of than to bring in, and become a crutch for weak managers to lean on and hide behind - as a result, their tip must always be taken with a grain of salt. Another issue is that bringing in contractors usually reduces flexibility (eg. the outsourced warehouseman can no longer be asked to pitch in to support with a delivery crisis) and unforeseen changes in technology and/or task requirements make never-ending 'discussions' over who is responsible. Another issue with privatization is that it creates a strong never-ending incentive to for personal contractors to lobby for more government services etc., and a major fresh source of campaign another section, Stanger points out that U.S. interests in the Mexican embassy were (and probably still are) promoted by representatives from 32 various agencies, that in 2005 the federal government had contractors in every U.N.-recognized country but Bhutan, Nauru, and San Marino, and we have military bases in 130+ countries. This gets to an even bigger issue - the size, reach, and complexity of American government. We end up with spaghetti-like organization and flow charts, never-ending coordination meetings, and obvious silliness such as the Director of Homeland Security giving briefings on the availability of swine flu vaccine. More important, it just doesn't work - both 9/11 and the Ft. Hood shooting took put despite numerous warnings, government's response to Hurricane Katrina was horribly botched, Madoff's Ponzi scheme was missed until he turned himself in, our financial system nearly collapsed latest year, and pupil try scores and dropout rates have stagnated for decades,Bottom Line: I doubt that any 'super-manager' (eg. a composite of Peter Drucker, Andy Grove, Steve Jobs, Jack Welch and anyone else you might want) would even wish to test managing the federal government as it now stands. Significantly improving government performance requires that we first stop digging holes - the most obvious example is the link between our overly-biased help for Israel and the ensuing increased motivation for terrorism. A second is staying out of the affairs of other nations - our own 'bought and for' democracy is an embarrassment, as well as our financial management, and we need to stop telling others how to run their affairs - especially China and Russia. A third is reducing our dependence on foreign oil and associated interference in Iran, Iraq, and (formerly) Saudi Arabia. Fourth, obtain out of Afghanistan and Iraq - there is no reason to be there. At that point we need to implement a major government downsizing - eg. at least 50% in the Pentagon (we already spend about as much as the rest of the globe combined), 75%+ in Departments of Commerce, Labor, State, and others; this would need to be accompanied by significantly reducing the accompanying rules and regulations. Then, reconsider restructuring. Only then does it create sense to consider Stanger's question of "What should be privatized?" Perhaps nothing.
The Hell of Amazing Intentions is a amazing read. Stephen Walt is a professor of international affairs at Harvard. He explains what has gone wrong with American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Walt believes that the U.S. has tried to spread “liberal hegemony” throughout the globe and this has been a failure. Walt argues that since the end of the Cold Battle Washington has tried to play the role of global hegemon, but we are suffering from what Yale professor Paul Kennedy called “imperial overstretch.” The rest of the globe is getting richer and we are in relative decline. Walt believes we have too a lot of international obligations and we meddle too much in other country's affairs. He suggests that we need to forget about being the world’s policeman and focus more on solving our own domestic problems. We should spend more fixing the homeland.Walt believes that the Washington foreign policy elite is arrogant, out of touch and still stuck in the 1990s. When the Cold Battle ended the U.S. emerged as the “winner” and was the world’s only superpower. This win went to a lot of people's heads in Washington. They believed in American exceptionalism and that the U.S. had an almost divine right to run the world. American power supposedly rivaled imperial Rome. Like Rome, Washington wanted to discourage potential rivals, the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine. Jeffrey Sachs a professor at Columbia University, believes this helps explain the current hostility to China. In China, America is facing its first serious economic competitor since it overtook Britain in the 19th century. As Harvard professor Graham Allison has pointed out in his book, “Destined for War” we should test and avoid a battle with China, it probably won’t end well.Washington has also wanted to spread democracy and liberal economics within an American sphere of influence that encompassed the rest of the world. It was believed that the U.S. could use its power to shape the globe so that democracy, human rights, economic interdependence, and durable peace would prevail. The countries helped would continue to look to America for leadership. Germany, Japan, and South Korea were the main examples. Walt defines “liberal hegemony” as something that “seeks to use American power to defend and spread the traditional liberal principles of individual freedom, democratic governance, and a market-based economy.”Walt points out that Clinton, Bush, and Obama all shared related foreign policy objectives. He argues that their agenda rested on three mistaken assumptions. Firstly, other countries will welcome U.S.-style liberalism. It was assumed that the Muslim globe could be Americanized. The second, that the U.S. could successfully promote democratic values worldwide. Non-democratic regimes that were opposed to American influence could be sanctioned and threatened with force. When tougher measures were required, the U.S. could use its strong military to remove despotic regimes and impose democracy. Unfortunately, regime change using military force has not gone well in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nation building in the Muslim globe has proved expensive in terms of blood and treasure. Thirdly, old-fashioned ideas like "balance of power" politics, spheres of influence, and nationalism were obsolete. However, China and Russia are increasingly behaving like amazing powers from the past. They are trying to maintain spheres of influence along their borders and in Ukraine and the South China e book suggests that the Washington elite believes it is America’s destiny to lead the globe forever. However, there is an increasing number of countries who are rejecting American leadership, especially with Trump as president. I was in Europe recently, and President Macron of France had just made a stir by declaring that the EU required its own troops to protect itself from Russia, China, and the U.S. Merkel seemed to agree with him. Europeans are satisfied to keep American protection but they view the globe differently. France did not send units to support in Vietnam or Iraq, but it works with the U.S. in Africa. The French and the EU don’t regard themselves as American e spread of liberal democracy once seemed inevitable. Walt argues that “both the overall condition of the globe and America’s status within it had declined steadily and significantly between 1993 and 2016." The number of authoritarian regimes globally is increasing. Relations with Russia and China have soured, the Middle East is a mess, and democratic institutions overseas are being eroded. China will never become a democracy. Russians seem satisfied with a powerful man like Putin as their leader. In Walt’s telling, “the energetic pursuit of liberal hegemony was mostly a failure. … By 2017, in fact, democracy was in retreat in a lot of locations and under considerable strain in the U.S. itself.”The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were based on the assumption that the U.S. military could clear the method for nation-building and a fresh democratic would emerge. In both countries, stability and democracy, are still far off, despite the cost. Almost 7,000 members of the military have died in both battles and the financial costs are estimated at about $5.6 trillion. We can’t afford too a lot of related battles of choice. The U.S. has 800 bases around the globe and we have defense pacts with 69 countries. If America's global footprint was reduced a lot of people in Washington and in the defense industry would have to search fresh careers, so we still pretend it is 1993 and the U.S. is all powerful. Walt believes that part of the defense budget would be better spent at home, upgrading the country's infrastructure.If you travel to Shanghai you message that the airport is much more impressive than any of our airports, especially La Guardia. Chinese trains, roads, and bridges are also very modern. A lot of U.S. infrastructure looks Third Globe in comparison. China, in PPP terms, already has the world’s biggest economy. Unfortunately, we seem to be pushing Russia and China together. Both view the presence of the U.S. military close to their borders as provocative. Graham Allison believes this confrontational approach is dangerous.Walt spends a lot of time attacking Washington’s foreign policy elites. He claims that their attempts to create the globe “in our image” have failed. Walt argues that government officials and media commentators who have promoted disastrous battles suffer no consequences and are welcomed back into circles of power — and that “it is the dissidents and critics who end up marginalized or penalized, even when they are proved right.” John Bolton was a neo-conservative and an enthusiastic supporter of the Iraq War, he also advocated regime change in Iran and North Korea. He's now Trump’s National Security Advisor. Walt believes the foreign policy elite since the Clinton era have been able to avoid accountability and maintain influence despite past blunders. Walt asserts that their recurring failures are a huge reason why Donald Trump was ump on the campaign trail had challenged a whole series of orthodoxies in American foreign policy. These included: the assumption that the U.S. was the indispensable power and was required to run a liberal globe order. He also took aim at NATO and trade agreements, like NAFTA. Trump was dismissed as an idiot by the foreign policy elite, especially those who identified as Republicans. However, Trump's appointment of John Bolton indicates that he may now be under the spell of the Washington foreign policy establishment. Resistance may be futile, even for somebody like Trump.Walt proposes a program of “offshore balancing” that would emphasize American interests and promote globe peace. This contains the abandonment of threats of regime change, as with those recently directed versus North Korea. Walt believes that “countries usually seek nuclear weapons because they fear being attacked and wish a strong deterrent, and U.S. efforts at regime change heighten such fears.” In 2003 Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi agreed to eliminate his country's nuclear program in return for peace and assurances that Libya would not be attacked. Within a few years, Libya was attacked by the U.S., France and Britain and Gadhafi was overthrown and killed by rebels empowered by Washington. The lessons for North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran are perhaps, don’t give up your nukes no matter what promises are made.Walt concludes that the U.S. should ditch its commitment to liberal internationalism, reduce its defense spending and worldwide military commitments, direct the savings toward solving domestic problems, and insist that its wealthy allies in Europe and Asia take the lead in defending themselves rather than relying indefinitely on U.S. protection. A battle with Russia and China would not be a amazing idea, it would be expensive and we might lose. Walt is also skeptical of democracy promotion, nation-building, and armed humanitarian intervention. These schemes are often marked by ignorance about the history and culture of other countries. This was demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, members of the Taliban probably don't aspire to work at a Walmart or a McDonald's.Walt suggests that our foreign policy experts are mistaken in assuming that America can remain the dominant global power indefinitely. China's economy is growing fast. Our mounting national debt and unpopularity in a lot of parts of the globe indicate that perhaps we need to rethink our global ambitions. We might also need to begin modifying our behavior. Instead of remaking the globe in America’s image, Walt suggests focusing U.S. foreign policy on upholding the balance of power in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Walt would favor intervention “only when one or more of those balances was in danger of breaking down.” To conclude, the author believes America is on the wrong track and is pursuing a tactic it can no longer afford. He believes we need to go to back to basics and reduce our overseas commitments.
This is a clever book by an author who must be brilliant and who clearly is plugged into a amazing network of info and expertise. The book's identification of four flavors of U.S. foreign policy is handy and seems more accurate than its traditional two-way rivals: liberal vs. conservative, or idealistic vs. a "macro" theory, Mead supports the four-way approach by reference to "micro" foundations in U.S. political demography, particularly by citing the work of David Hackett Fischer. Mead's four schools are also reminiscent of the four-way Myers-Briggs typing of personality preferences: Jacksonians as SJs, Jeffersonians as SPs, Hamiltonians as NTs, and Wilsonians as NFs?Mead's book is clever in at least two other rst, Mead risks small actual analysis and tip regarding real-world foreign policy. His main point about the outside globe is that U.S. foreign policy is easier to formulate and implement when the globe is simple. Humorist Richard Armour created a related point when he concluded one of his historical reviews with the observation that the American people of the 1950s were "secure in the knowledge of whom to hate." This continues to be an necessary point: it illustrates the current usefulness of the Arab Muslim photo in building a broad U.S. political cond, Mead has something for everyone -- at least, for every American. With malice toward none, with charity for all, he has praise for all four of the U.S. schools. He has obviously struggled with his presentation of the Jacksonian school (the militant fundamentalists), which is the one that seems farthest from Mead's roots as an intellectual. Mead credits Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. with helping him be positive about Andrew Jackson himself.But although Mead disclaims triumphalism, he implicitly evaluates foreign policy in nationalistic terms: gains of location and other wealth for the U.S., with low U.S. casualties, is the measure of U.S. foreign policy achievement. While he regrets non-U.S. casualties, he warns versus trying to create too much of the rest of the these standards, Mead proclaims U.S. foreign policy a success and thus well conceived, even in the period before the First Globe War, when traditionally the U.S. was not supposed to be paying much attention to foreign is seeming paradox is partly explained by a factor that Mead does not emphasize sufficiently: the personal sector's role in expanding U.S. territory. Personal American colonization went ahead of the U.S. Government into a huge part of what became U.S. lands: the trans-Appalachian area, West Florida, Texas, California, Utah, and Hawaii, among the successful ad does note briefly that "before the Civil Battle Southerners looked to Texas, Central America, and Cuba for more slave states," but he does not tell in any detail the story of personal U.S. adventurers' attempted conquests in such areas, or of the U.S. Government's official actions for and versus these efforts. The case of the Philippines provides a contrasting example, where the U.S. Government took the initiative in conquering the location without personal American colonization. However, the non-governmental pattern resumed in the 1900s with personal Americans' participation in Israeli colonization, creating a Texas-type, lone-star republic, which, although not annexed, has a "special relationship" with the ese examples illustrate a mechanism by which the U.S. expanded its location with low U.S. Government troop casualties, and thus had a successful foreign policy by Mead's standard, without the U.S. Government paying as much attention to foreign policy as that success might imply.Obviously, territorial expansion has generated blowback, which the U.S. Government has often anticipated and tried to avoid or limit. Mead also recognizes the need to with this downside of expansionary foreign policy. He describes very effectively how the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools alternatives for succeeding in the larger world.We in the U.S. have family, friends, homes, businesses, and cultural interests outside our borders, which we will not wish to neglect. Mead's clarifying work is a substantial contribution to helping us think about our approach.
Really? The leading candidate for the Democratic nomination who is leading in the polls to become our next President may have an entanglement with a foreign power, and the American people have no national interest in clearing this up BEFORE he gets nominated? Are you kidding?For the record, I doubt an investigation would turn up any serious malfeasance by Joe Biden, but we need to know the facts. I read an interview with Dr. Nye in the Harvard Gazette and it just saddened me to see yet another person who doesn't understand why Trump won and why he acts like he does emotionally pile sten to Scott Adams on YouTube if you wish an unbiased view about Trump. This may be a amazing book about Presidents from FDR to Clinton, but judging more latest Presidents probably needs a bit more distance and a lot less emotion.
This book is beautiful informative, though it's more like a text book than I thought it would be. Dry and without any true philosophical perspective, there's lots of info but small in the method of insight, imo. For my taste, history is about putting things into context and extrapolating insight from past events. This book doesn't go that far, just a recitation of happenings in the past.
This book is informative, well written and sophisticated enough to serve as a college textbook on American foreign policy. The text lacks cohesion at times and there are certain points that leave you wishing there was more detail. There is a slight bias to the left, but it has small result on the content.
To my knowledge this is the only guidebook in English devoted solely to Eritrea. The closest comparator is the Lonely Planet tutorial which covers both Ethiopia and Eritrea. As one might expect in a volume devoted purely to Eritrea, this volume has more info and detail (more maps of specific towns, for example) and the historical discussion of the origins of the independence movement is informative. As another reviewer mentioned, successive political regimes have changed the names of roads in downtown Asmara; in my experience, local people are familiar with both the "traditional" and the "official" names, and the use of the maps in this tutorial was not problematic. The one aspect in which the Lonely Planet tutorial tops this book is in that book's walking tours which I found quite useful.
Simple enough to read. Seems informational, though could pose bias. That said, this is the most poorly edited textbook I have ever read. Multiple misspelled words throughout, usually 1 letter off. Cannot believe these were not corrected by the 6th edition.
I hate to give a textbook 5 stars but I will for this book. Here's why:1. It's little and simple to carry in my purse so I can read it when I have time.2. Sports studies are actually relevant to nurses and I wish to know the answers to the questions that are posed.4. Online content.5. Eye catching graphics are not at's it.
This is one of the poorest guidebooks I have ever used!In powerful contrast to Bradt's perfect tutorial to neighbouring Ethiopia, this tutorial to Eritrea is so not good it is nearly useless.Even before departure, I found that the book just failed to create Eritrea sound exciting - it created it sound e very weakest points are its maps!Can you believe that a full page regional map of say, Western Eritrea, can have a grand total of four (yes, FOUR!) locations in that region marked on it, fewer than are marked on the much smaller map for the entire country, and failing to present even the locations that are described in the relevant section of the guide???The town map for Asmara is a joke (I've uploaded a scanned photo of it to see for yourself), with no names marked for most streets, and most of those that are marked being old names that were changed years ings to see & do? Very few described, very poorly.History & politics? These chapters look as if they had been contributed by the propaganda department of the Eritrean government, with glorifying accounts of the heroic war for freedom and no mentioning of the disgraceful present.Flora & fauna? The author's knowledge seems to end at distinguishing a mammal from a bird - e bottom line is that until Bradt gets a fresh author to rewrite this tutorial completely, you are far better off reading the shorter but much better chapter on this unbelievable country in Lonely Planet's Ethiopia & Eritrea tutorial than wasting your money, like I did, on ordering this e 2 stars were only given as an acknowledgement for the publisher's effort to place out a separate tutorial to this unusual destination, not for the actual value of this book which is closer to zero.
Basics: 2009, hardcover, 463 pages, 29 of 32 endemics with color photos, 872 species with a breeding/status atlas map, text of distribution and habitat, a lot of listsThis is a thorough reference book to the distribution and status of all species found in both Ethiopia and Eritrea. The heart of the book is its 872 atlas style maps. Using a grid of 528 squares over the region, the presence of each bird in a square is represented by four distinct symbols. These represent either a confirmed sighting/specimen, an uncertain record, confirmed breeding, or uncertain e paragraph accompanying each map consists of the bird's status in the country, migration pattern, distribution notes, breeding behavior and dates, and favored sites. This info is about one paragraph in length.Other than a dozen or so black-and-white images of different habitats, the only other images in this book are 29 excellent, nice-sized color images. These represent all but 3 of the region's 32 endemic birds. Not illustrated are the Red-billed Pytilia, the uncertain Ethiopian Cliff Swallow, and the never seen Nechisar Nightjar (known from only a single wing).For the data oriented birder, this book a amazing of extra information. The 70 pages at the beginning cover a wide range of info from ornithological history to topography and geology to vegetation to breeding seasons. There are also 14 amazing quality color maps of the region showing a dozens of geologic, climate, and vegetative e latest 78 pages of the book a lot of lists that cover hybrids, endemics, hypotheticals, necessary bird areas, bird ringing/banding, a gazetteer, and is book will appeal to the more ardent ornithologist, the traveling birder, and the Abyssian enthusiast; however, its emphasis on maps and data with few images and no identification may be a small dry for a lot of other birders.I've listed several similar books below...1) A Tutorial to Endemic Birds of Ethiopia and Eritrea by Pol2) Ethiopia's endemic birds by Urban3) Birds of the Horn of Africa by Redman4) A Checklist of the Birds of Ethiopia by Urban5) Ethiopia: In Find of Endemic Birds by Francis6) Birds of Somalia by Ash7) The Birds of East Africa by Stevenson8) Birds of Kenya and Northern Tanzania by Zimmerman9) A Bird Atlas of Kenya by Lewis(written by Soleglad at Avian Review or Avian Books, May 2009)
Planning a trip to Ethiopia is hard enough, as there is very small available online of in depth information. But, Lonely Planet has answered most of my questions, as usual, which always makes my trips much easier to plan. As a single female traveller, I obtain upset when there isn't a LP tutorial for a certain country and their Ethiopia/Eritrea book does it all!
A wealth of info for my upcoming trip to Ethiopia. However, the font/type is so little that it is impossible to read without a magnifying glass. I always Lonely Planet tutorial books for everywhere I travel, and none of them have this problem. Perhaps the issue arose because they tried to place info about two countries into one book.